Agentic Covenants Matrix
If the agent decides to violate this concern, what stops it at this layer?
Filter
Layers, by what they can actually enforce
- In-agent: advisory
System prompts, model training, tool descriptions, refusals. No homeostatic stake, no pre-action pause, no learning loop. Treat as nudge, not control.
- Client-side hooks: deterministic-when-invoked
Operator-machine or agent-execution context. Strong against language attacks. Weak against an agent with shell access and time.
- Server-side enforcement: deterministic-and-external
Runs on the target system, not on the agent. Bypass requires compromise, policy gaps, or operator manipulation.
Showing 3 of 18.
Supply chain at In-agent
No enforcement at this layer; advisory only. Model warns about unvetted packages or unfamiliar MCP servers, frequently wrong about provenance. Prevention lives in client-side and server-side.
Supply chain at Client-side hooks
MCP server allowlist with hash pinning, Sigstore verification, lockfile pinning, pre-commit deps scan.
Supply chain at Server-side enforcement
OCI signature verification (cosign), SBOM admission, egress NetworkPolicy, OPA attestation policy, MCP domain allowlist at network layer.