Agentic Covenants Matrix
If the agent decides to violate this concern, what stops it at this layer?
Filter
Layers, by what they can actually enforce
- In-agent: advisory
System prompts, model training, tool descriptions, refusals. No homeostatic stake, no pre-action pause, no learning loop. Treat as nudge, not control.
- Client-side hooks: deterministic-when-invoked
Operator-machine or agent-execution context. Strong against language attacks. Weak against an agent with shell access and time.
- Server-side enforcement: deterministic-and-external
Runs on the target system, not on the agent. Bypass requires compromise, policy gaps, or operator manipulation.
Showing 3 of 18.
Authorization at In-agent
Model instructions and scoped tool descriptions.
Authorization at Client-side hooks
Deny-by-default tool allowlist, capability-based restriction, PreToolUse hooks, pre-commit hooks.
Authorization at Server-side enforcement
Scoped RBAC Roles, IAM with explicit ARN, Kyverno or OPA admission, namespace scoping.