Agentic Sentinels Matrix
If this concern is breached, how do we know?
Filter
Layers, by what they can actually enforce
- In-agent (forensic only) — forensic
Transcript and tool-call logs from the agent runtime. Forensic value, not real-time. Lethal-trifecta detector at the wrapper layer is the only L1 with detection value.
- Client-side hooks — deterministic-when-shipped
auditd, eBPF, hook decision logs, MCP allowlist violation logs. Tamper-evident only if logs ship to a remote sink owned by the operator, not the agent.
- Server-side enforcement — external-and-authoritative
Kubernetes audit logs, CloudTrail, Falco, Hubble, Kyverno PolicyReports, GitHub webhooks. External to the agent's compromise model.
Showing 3 of 15.
Supply chain at In-agent (forensic only)
"Where did this dependency come from" forensically traceable through tool-call log.
Supply chain at Client-side hooks
MCP allowlist violation events; tool-description hash mismatch alerting; lockfile diff in CI logs centralized; pre-commit dependency scan results.
Supply chain at Server-side enforcement
Image-pull events with signature verification status; SBOM diff over time per workload; cosign verification failures; egress NetworkPolicy denials to non-allowlisted MCP domains.