Agentic Sentinels Matrix

If this concern is breached, how do we know?

Filter

In-agent (forensic only) — forensic
Transcript and tool-call logs from the agent runtime. Forensic value, not real-time. Lethal-trifecta detector at the wrapper layer is the only L1 with detection value.
Client-side hooks — deterministic-when-shipped
auditd, eBPF, hook decision logs, MCP allowlist violation logs. Tamper-evident only if logs ship to a remote sink owned by the operator, not the agent.
Server-side enforcement — external-and-authoritative
Kubernetes audit logs, CloudTrail, Falco, Hubble, Kyverno PolicyReports, GitHub webhooks. External to the agent's compromise model.

Showing 3 of 15.

Identity at In-agent (forensic only)
Tool-call logs include credential fingerprint (hash, never raw token); session correlation.
Identity at Client-side hooks
PreToolUse hook emits structured identity events; auditd watches agent process startup; Vector/Fluent Bit ships to SIEM.
Identity at Server-side enforcement
K8s audit log captures every agent SA action; CloudTrail with Object Lock; SIEM rules on out-of-hours, unexpected source IP, identity reuse.