Agentic Sentinels Matrix

If this concern is breached, how do we know?

Filter

In-agent (forensic only) — forensic
Transcript and tool-call logs from the agent runtime. Forensic value, not real-time. Lethal-trifecta detector at the wrapper layer is the only L1 with detection value.
Client-side hooks — deterministic-when-shipped
auditd, eBPF, hook decision logs, MCP allowlist violation logs. Tamper-evident only if logs ship to a remote sink owned by the operator, not the agent.
Server-side enforcement — external-and-authoritative
Kubernetes audit logs, CloudTrail, Falco, Hubble, Kyverno PolicyReports, GitHub webhooks. External to the agent's compromise model.

Showing 3 of 15.

Authorization at In-agent (forensic only)
Tool descriptions logged with each call (forensic).
Authorization at Client-side hooks
Hook decision events (allow/ask/deny/error); auditd watches hook config edits and --no-verify; SIEM rule for multi-deny patterns.
Authorization at Server-side enforcement
RBAC denial events from K8s audit; IAM Access Analyzer findings; Kyverno PolicyReports; OPA decision logs centralized.