Agentic Interventions Matrix
How do I stop the bleeding now?
Filter
Layers, by what they can actually enforce
- In-agent (empty) — none
An agent acting badly cannot be reliably told to stop. Empty for response. Listed for completeness.
- Client-side cutoffs — fast
Operator-machine actions. Milliseconds to seconds. Effective if the agent is contained to one host.
- Server-side cutoffs — authoritative
Target-system actions. Seconds to minutes. Catches agents and operator hosts that have been compromised.
Showing 5 of 15.
Identity at Server-side cutoffs
Revoke OIDC token at IdP, disable ServiceAccount, rotate IAM keys, attach deny-all IAM policy, invalidate all active sessions.
Authorization at Server-side cutoffs
Apply emergency Kyverno deny-all, replace agent Role with empty rules, attach IAM deny-all, Git pre-receive reject.
Blast radius at Server-side cutoffs
Apply emergency NetworkPolicy default-deny, scale Deployment to zero, force-delete pods, optionally cordon node, block egress at cloud firewall.
Approval gating at Server-side cutoffs
Lock branch protection (revoke bypass perms, raise required reviewers), pause CI/CD, engage deployment freeze, lock GitHub environments.
Supply chain at Server-side cutoffs
Remove poisoned image from registry, deploy emergency Kyverno deny rule on signature, block compromised registry/MCP domain at network/DNS, force redeploy with last-known-good image SHA pinned.