Agentic Interventions Matrix

How do I stop the bleeding now?

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All 15 In-agent (empty)Client-side cutoffs Server-side cutoffs Identity Authorization Blast radius Approval gating Supply chain

Layers, by what they can actually enforce

In-agent (empty) — none
An agent acting badly cannot be reliably told to stop. Empty for response. Listed for completeness.
Client-side cutoffs — fast
Operator-machine actions. Milliseconds to seconds. Effective if the agent is contained to one host.
Server-side cutoffs — authoritative
Target-system actions. Seconds to minutes. Catches agents and operator hosts that have been compromised.

Showing 15 of 15.

Identity at In-agent (empty)
(no enforcement; the agent that misuses identity will not voluntarily revoke it)
Identity at Client-side cutoffs
Kill agent process tree, delete local credential file, force re-authentication on next launch, logout SSO session on the operator host.
Identity at Server-side cutoffs
Revoke OIDC token at IdP, disable ServiceAccount, rotate IAM keys, attach deny-all IAM policy, invalidate all active sessions.
Authorization at In-agent (empty)
(no enforcement)
Authorization at Client-side cutoffs
Force-replace local hook config with deny-all, lock with chattr +i, kill running agent.
Authorization at Server-side cutoffs
Apply emergency Kyverno deny-all, replace agent Role with empty rules, attach IAM deny-all, Git pre-receive reject.
Blast radius at In-agent (empty)
(no enforcement)
Blast radius at Client-side cutoffs
kill -KILL the agent process tree, tear down sandbox, optionally network-isolate operator host, docker stop or kubectl delete pod.
Blast radius at Server-side cutoffs
Apply emergency NetworkPolicy default-deny, scale Deployment to zero, force-delete pods, optionally cordon node, block egress at cloud firewall.
Approval gating at In-agent (empty)
(no enforcement)
Approval gating at Client-side cutoffs
Replace approval hook with deny-all, disable Auto Mode classifier, disable judgment-query escalation channel, force out-of-band on every action.
Approval gating at Server-side cutoffs
Lock branch protection (revoke bypass perms, raise required reviewers), pause CI/CD, engage deployment freeze, lock GitHub environments.
Supply chain at In-agent (empty)
(no enforcement)
Supply chain at Client-side cutoffs
Remove suspect MCP server from allowlist, quarantine downloaded packages to restricted location, lock lockfile, pin runtime to last-known-good, kill agent.
Supply chain at Server-side cutoffs
Remove poisoned image from registry, deploy emergency Kyverno deny rule on signature, block compromised registry/MCP domain at network/DNS, force redeploy with last-known-good image SHA pinned.