Agentic Covenants / Agentic Covenants Matrix
Content integrity at Server-side enforcement
This layer is deterministic-and-external.
Egress NetworkPolicy so exfiltration has nowhere to post, DLP at the boundary, and send-side audit written outside the agent's reach. Deliberately the weakest server-side cell in the framework: it catches the consequence, not the manipulation. The control that actually works is not a content control at all. A scoped credential, deny-by-default RBAC, and default-deny egress make a successful injection worthless, so injection is an authorization and blast-radius problem wearing a content costume.
How it is still bypassed
- exfiltration through an allowlisted write-capable host
- DNS and timing channels
- end-to-end encrypted destinations defeating DLP
Maps to
- NIST CSF 2.0
- PR.DS-02, DE.CM-01, PR.IR-01
- NIST AI RMF
- MANAGE 2.2
- OWASP LLM
- LLM02
- OWASP Agentic
- ASI02